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Recent research on the world’s 500 largest companies has established that the majority of 
international business occurs within regional clusters in the three largest economic 
regions of North America, Europe, and Asia (the triad). This finding extends to the 18 
companies in the chemicals and pharmaceuticals sector, which is the most innovative in 




This paper examines the R&D and strategies of the world’s largest firms in the 
pharmaceuticals sector and finds a high degree of intra-regional sales. R&D and sales are 
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relative size of the U.S. market, compared to other parts of the triad, creates imbalances 
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Abbreviated Heading:  Regional Strategies in Chemicals   1
Introduction 
 
A new research stream has demonstrated that the vast majority of international business 
activity is conducted on a regional basis, rather than globally. By regional is meant the 
large “triad” markets of the European Union (E.U.), the United States (or, more broadly, 
NAFTA), and Japan (or, more broadly, all of Asia). This research is illustrated in 
Rugman (2000) (2003), Rugman and Brain (2003), and Rugman and Verbeke (2004).  
Of the world’s 500 largest multinational enterprises (MNEs), the sector which is 
consistently one of the most innovative is chemicals and pharmaceuticals. In this paper 
we examine the R&D of the 18 MNEs in this sector and relate this to the regional nature 
of their sales. Of the 500 largest companies in the world, it is possible to find data on 
their geographic sales in the “broad” triad regions of Europe, North America, and Asia. 
These data exist for 380 of the 500 firms. Of these 380, 200 are in services, leaving 180 
in manufacturing, see Table 1. Of the 180 manufacturing MNEs, there are 18 in the 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals sector. 
Table 1 here 
  
Of these 18 MNEs in the chemicals sector, data are available for all 18 (one 
company, Pharmacia, was acquired by Pfizer in 2002) and these can be classified as 
shown in Table 2:-  
Global 0 
Bi-regional 5 
Host bi-regional 2 
Home region   11
   2
The regional sales of these 18 MNEs, across the triad, are also reported in Table 
2. Their average home-region sales are 54.5%, while for all 180 MNEs in manufacturing 
it is 62%. 
Table 2 here 
 
Table 3 examines the R&D of these MNEs. The average R&D to sales percent for 
these chemical and pharmaceutical MNEs is 9.9%. Eli Lilly had the highest R&D to sales 
expenditures at 19.4%, followed by other pharmaceutical companies such as:- 
AstraZeneca at 17.2%; Aventis at 16.6%, and Pfizer at 16%. In contrast, there were 
relatively low R&D expenditures by chemical firms:- BASF at 3.5%; Dow Chemicals at 
3.9%; and DuPont at 5.3%. These data suggest that pharmaceutical companies conduct 
greater R&D than chemical MNEs. 
Table 3 here 
In this paper we analyze such innovation differences in the chemicals sector, 
especially in pharmaceuticals which records consistently higher R&D expenditures than 
pure chemical MNEs. Once a drug has been developed and patented, few substitutes if 
any, can compete with it over a prescribed period of time. Patients suffering from disease, 
especially those that are terminal or which produce discomfort, have a significantly 
inelastic demand for drugs as do the doctors working with health insurance schemes. 
Since the cost of manufacturing a drug is often marginal, pharmaceutical firms depend on 
national patent protection for their discovery to generate profits. Over the last decade, the 
development of drugs has become more and more expensive and produced lower profits 
than in previous decades. Yet, as a pharmaceutical’s survival is dependent on new drug   3
development, R&D expenditures are the only way of assuring the long-term survival of 
the company.  
The products of chemical companies, on the other hand, are often not necessities 
and have many substitutes. Marketing a differentiated product to the consumer is often 
the only way to obtain a premium price. R&D investment might produce a better paint, 
textile, pesticide, or plastic but many chemical products are now commodities, with low 
returns to R&D.  
It is often difficult to disentangle chemical companies and pharmaceutical 
companies as they tend to engage in similar businesses. For instance, companies in both 
sectors engage in biotechnology, and some chemical companies have pharmaceutical 
operations. It is no surprise that Bayer, which has a large pharmaceutical arm, is the 
chemical company with the highest R&D to sales ratio. In Table 4, the R&D to sales 
ratios of the six chemical and twelve pharmaceutical MNEs are reported. On average, 
pharmaceutical companies spend 12% of revenues on R&D, more than twice that spent 
by chemical companies. 
Table 4 here 
 Pharmaceutical companies also tend to be slightly more intra-regionally oriented 
with regards to revenue. This might reflect a relatively tougher set of regulations for 
pharmaceutical companies. At nearly twice the size of the European market, the United 
States is the largest world market for pharmaceuticals. It is also the fastest growing, and 
not surprisingly, where most large pharmaceutical companies prefer to operate.  
The Boston Consulting Group estimates that 40% of all research facilities of large 
pharmaceutical companies in the world are located in the United States. While a major   4
reason for this is the large size of the U.S. market, most importantly, on average U.S. 
residents pay more than twice as much as Europeans for pharmaceutical products. Price 
controls in European countries can influence upwards the extra-regional percentage of 
sales for European pharmaceutical MNEs while decreasing the extra-regional percentage 
sales of U.S. pharmaceutical MNEs. 
  Most firms tend to have a larger portion of their R&D facilities in their home 
region of the triad. Indeed, looking at Table 7.5, which shows the distribution of R&D 
facilities across the triad for a selected number of pharmaceuticals, all of the firms show 
over 50% of their R&D facilities to be in their home region. This, however, understates 
the significance of home-region based R&D. The number of facilities tells us little about 
the particular importance, or of the resources devoted to research, in a given geographic 
region. A more telling statistic would be the amount of R&D expenditure in each region. 
This information is generally not available. R&D is highly centralized in the home region 
of the firm, even when sales are spread more across regions. For instance, host-region 
oriented European-based firms, like AstraZeneca and GSK, continue to have over 50% of 
their R&D facilities in Europe. Bayer, the bi-regional chemical company, allocates over 
70% of its R&D budget to Europe even though this region accounts for only 41.3% of 
total revenues.  
 
Table 5 Here   5
Barriers to Global Strategy in the Pharmaceutical Industry 
A set of stringent local and regional regulations prevent pharmaceutical companies from 
adopting a global strategy. R&D and sales are more concentrated within North America 
and Europe than in Asia. In addition, the relative size of the U.S. market for 
pharmaceuticals creates a significant imbalance that shapes the industry and defines 
international strategy. In chemicals, a lower dependency on patents, the existence of 
multiple substitutes, and the commodity nature of products results in lower R&D 
spending and more geographically spread sales.  
The pharmaceutical industry is heavily regulated by national and regional 
governments. The first set of regulations that pharmaceutical firms must overcome is the 
drug approval process. Presently, this approval is attained at a national level, so 
pharmaceuticals must test their products and follow the procedures in each jurisdiction. 
The E.U., however, is moving towards a regional approval process to take effect in 2004 
or later (FDA News, 2003). The liability for damage caused by drugs also varies across 
nations and must be taken into account when introducing a new drug.  
  Another set of regulations is price controls. Some countries have price controls 
for pharmaceuticals in the form of fixed pricing, reference price lists, or volunteer 
agreements with the pharmaceutical sector. The United States, the largest pharmaceutical 
market in the world accounting for nearly half of the world’s market for pharmaceuticals, 
takes a more laissez faire approach to pharmaceutical pricing; thus there is more R&D in 
the United States than in Europe.    6
In Germany, the government has adopted regulations to decrease the overall 
expenditure on pharmaceuticals. A reference price system forces patients to pay the 
difference between the reference price and the market price. Since most patients are not 
willing to pay this difference for many drugs, pharmaceutical companies are forced to 
bring their prices down to the reference price or face a huge decrease in sales of 
prescription drugs. The French government encourages the use of generics and directly 
regulates prices of prescription drugs. In 2003, the Italian government implemented a 
pharmaceutical-reimbursement policy that would only offer refund to a level set by the 
Health Ministry. The Department of Health of the U.K. has the power to regulate prices 
for pharmaceutical products and control the profits of pharmaceutical companies. As a 
result, a voluntary agreement was reached in which manufacturers can set initial prices 
for their drugs, but price increases are regulated.  
Marketing is done at a national level. This is because governments not only 
approve a drug and might set prices, but they also regulate distribution and advertising. 
The type of packaging and labeling that is permitted and whether a drug is sold only with 
a prescription is the decision of each government. Governments may even force 
pharmaceuticals to license the rights to produce their patented drugs. Some governments 
allow pharmaceuticals to market directly to consumers; others restrict this practice while 
others ban it altogether.  
Many pharmaceutical (and chemical) companies are also in the crop-science 
business and must plan their strategies to conform to individual government regulations 
and customer perceptions about genetically modified crops.    7
Despite such barriers to trade, pharmaceutical products have some of the lowest 
percentage of intra-regional sales among manufacturing industries. A number of factors 
explain this. (1) Most pharmaceutical products need not be heavily adapted (in some 
cases only the packaging and labeling is different) for each geographic market. (2) Large 
pharmaceutical companies own the rights to brand-name drugs that are essential for 
healthcare across the world. (3) Once research and development costs are sunk, 
pharmaceutical companies will continue to sell the drug despite government price control 
as long as a profit on production costs is made. What governments are doing is basically 
regulating monopolies on patented drugs which may have very inelastic demand curves.  
Case Studies 
We now examine the strategies of six pharmaceutical MNEs in a set of case studies. In 
these case studies we analyze the strategy and structure of the MNE, especially in relation 
to its R&D. We use frameworks from international business strategy, such as Rugman 
and Verbeke (1990) with their focus on firm-specific advantages (FSAs) and country-
specific advantages (CSAs). The MNEs to be examined are:- 












In 1999, Hoechst of Germany and Rhône-Poulenc of France combined their businesses to 
create Aventis—a bi-regional pharmaceutical company that researches, develops,   8
manufactures, and markets branded prescription drugs. In 2002, Aventis employed 
71,000 people in 100 countries around the world. Although 91.2% of its revenues are 
derived from sales in foreign markets, the European region accounts for 36.4% of 
revenues. The most important market for Aventis is North America, where it derives 
44.8% of its revenues. Asia-Pacific accounts for approximately 6.4% of sales.  
  Aventis is organized across business lines. Its core businesses include: 
prescription drugs, human vaccines, and animal health. The company markets its 
products through its commercial subsidiaries. The most important of these are located in 
the United States, Japan, France and Germany, which together account for 64% of 
Aventis’ core business sales. Presently, Aventis is aggressively seeking expansion in the 
U.S. market. The company currently derives just below 40% of its sales from this 
country, significantly less than other large European pharmaceuticals. Aventis’ structure 
is centralized in terms of drug development and is decentralized in terms of marketing. 
The company is divided into three core businesses, and its commercial operations are 
nationally responsive units in major markets. Its North American marketing operations 
are just as important as the European ones.  
  Aventis’ strategy is one of low levels of economic integration in terms of 
marketing and high levels of national responsiveness. Once a drug has been developed, it 
must be approved by each national government in which it operates. Marketing must also 
be done in accordance with local legislation, the structure of the healthcare system which 
influences the distribution of drugs, price controls, and individual cultures and 
preferences of clients. The locally-based structure of the pharmaceutical industry makes 
high levels of economic integration in distribution and marketing impossible and forces   9
firms to be nationally responsive. Even in terms of manufacturing, whether a drug will be 
produced locally or imported across national borders is highly dependent on the 
regulations of the nation and regional trade treaties.  
  R&D centers for Aventis are located across the triad. Two research centers are 
based in Europe; there is one in North America and one in Asia-Pacific. Thus R&D 
shows high levels of economic integration. Indeed, Aventis’ development of a drug can 
take place in any of its R&D labs across the world and lead to a drug product that can be 
sold in all jurisdictions. Like all other pharmaceuticals, Aventis is faced with the 
increasing cost of production and marketing new drugs. The development of new and 
expensive R&D technology and the increasing layers of regulation in each national 
market increase the cost of bringing new drugs to market. On the revenue side, 
governments at all levels and other bulk clients are seeking to reduce healthcare 
expenditure. At the same time, a growing population with higher life expectancy is 
increasing the demand for pharmaceuticals. In industrialized countries the aging 
population seeks to live healthier lives by ensuring access to medication.  
  One major FSA that Aventis possesses is its drug portfolio and the R&D for its 
continued development. This is potentially a global advantage if a drug could be sold 
across the world. Unfortunately, individual national regulations prevent such global 
production and sales. Its pipeline of drugs in development and its researchers constitute 
FSAs that are potentially global but not in practice. The expertise of each individual 
marketing subsidiary is also an FSA. The CSAs are regional. The intellectual hubs that 
foster the ability of researchers have allowed Aventis to expand its R&D capabilities 
across the triad. There is one R&D facility in North America, one in Asia-Pacific, and   10
two in Europe. For the firm, each region has a set of regulations that it must adhere to. In 
the case of North America, its most important market, those regulations are dominated by 
those of the United States. The United States takes a more favorable stance on genetically 
modified foods than the E.U., and this is echoed by the population. Thus, Aventis would 




With £28.3 billion in revenues, and 100,000 employees, GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) is one 
of the largest pharmaceutical companies in the world. The company markets over 70 
prescription drugs and a variety of consumer healthcare products. Although incorporated 
in the U.K., over half of its sales originate in the United States. It is a host-region, bi-
regional company. 
Approximately 30 years ago, British Glaxo was a small company in the dry milk, 
antibiotics, respiratory drugs, and nutritional businesses. The discovery of Zantac, a drug 
to treat stomach ulcers, catapulted the company into the mainstream pharmaceuticals 
market and financed its expansion into the U.S. market. As the patent for Zantac was 
about to expire, Glaxo found itself in a sticky situation. Up to that point, the company had 
relied on internal R&D, but this had failed to develop the R&D capabilities for 
sustainable long-term growth. In 1995, the company merged with Wellcome, a company 
known for its strength in R&D and its lack of marketing capabilities. The merger was 
successful in that the new company produced a stream of new drugs that could be 
marketed using Glaxo’s expertise. In 2000, Glaxo Wellcome merged with SmithKline 
Beecham. According to Sir Richard Sykes, then chairman of Glaxo Wellcome, the 
deciphering of the human genome would transform the industry and only large   11
companies who can afford to invest to work with this new information would succeed. 
Together, these two companies are immune to the problem of losing a major blockbuster 
drug; no one drug accounts for more than 12% of the company’s revenues.  
Based on location of consumers, the United States is GSK’s largest market, 
accounting for 50.9% of revenues. If we consider only pharmaceuticals, the U.S. market 
becomes even more significant accounting for 54.4% of revenues. With Canada, this 
number increases to 56.8%. GSK derives 28.6% of its sales from its home-market region 
of Europe. In the heavily-regulated pharmaceutical market alone, GSK derives an even 
lower portion of its sales from the region, at 26.1%. The European market accounts for 
25% of the world market for pharmaceuticals. 
  GSK’s strategy is one of low economic integration in terms of marketing and high 
levels of national responsiveness. Government regulations, the structure of the local 
healthcare system, and cultural differences do not allow pharmaceutical firms to adopt 
strategies of high economic integration in distribution and marketing. GSK must be 
significantly more responsive to its host region of North America as it is its primary 
market. Nonetheless, R&D shows high levels of economic integration. Indeed, GSK’s 
development of a drug can take place in any of its R&D labs across the world and lead to 
a drug product that can be sold across all regions. It has developed a network where “best 
practice” in its R&D labs can be used anywhere in the network.  
The first step in the development of a drug is research and development. GSK 
spends over £2.6 billion in R&D and has over 15,000 researchers in 28 major R&D sites 
around the world. Of these, 14 are located in Europe, 10 in the U.K., and one in each of 
Belgium, France, Italy, and Spain. In North America, the United States houses five R&D   12
facilities and Canada one. In Japan, the company has R&D operations in the Tsukuba 
Science City in Takasaki.  
GSK spreads R&D around the world to take advantage of CSAs in terms of 
human resources and institutional infrastructure that might help it develop a new drug. 
For instance, it links to an academic department in a major research university with a 
teaching medical center that is exploring a new drug treatment. Another reason is to 
monitor more closely the research progress of its competitors, most of which also have 
R&D facilities in all areas of the world. Finally, R&D facilities might be better able to 
respond to the particular needs of regional communities.  
Once GSK has developed a new drug, it must obtain government approval. This 
must be done for each individual nation in which the company markets the product, and 
the process can be significantly different in each jurisdiction.  
Production and marketing are the next steps for a new drug. GSK’s supply chain 
is divided into a primary supply chain and a secondary supply chain. The primary supply 
chain manufactures active ingredients for its products and ships them to the secondary 
supply chain, which manufactures the end product. There are six primary supply chain 
sites: Australia, India, Ireland, Singapore, the United States, and the U.K. In Europe, 
there are 17 secondary supply chain sites. North America houses an additional six 
secondary supply chains. The rest of the world houses 32 secondary sites in 19 countries 
(the Middle East and Africa houses five sites, 22 sites are located in Asia-Pacific, and 
Latin America accounts for the remaining five sites).  
Proximity and regional regulations prevent multinationals from segmenting 
national markets. As a result, GSK was not able to continue selling drugs to Spain under   13
a two-price system, one for local consumption and one for exports into the E.U. 
Similarly, the integration of the North American market under NAFTA makes preventing 
the importation of Canadian pharmaceuticals into the United States difficult despite the 
health section having been exempted from the national treatment provisions of NAFTA. 
Indeed, pharmaceutical companies are struggling with supplying drugs to the Canadian 
market that erode their profits in the U.S. market. Beneficiaries from this intra-regional 
trade of drugs are considering whether to challenge the U.S. government and GSK under 
NAFTA to continue to trade in pharmaceuticals.  
Although the United States and Europe account for nearly 80% of GSK’s sales, 
developing countries took center stage over AIDS medications. In 2000, Cipla of India 
offered to produce generic versions of AIDS drugs to underdeveloped countries at a 90% 
markdown. GSK and other pharmaceuticals sued the South African government to stop 
the drug from being imported, but this sparked a public relations nightmare. Oxfam, a 
development NGO, accused the pharmaceuticals of waging war on the world’s poor. The 
companies had a difficult time explaining to their developed-country consumers how they 
could potentially let millions die of AIDS when a cure was readily available. Under a 
storm of criticism, the drug companies withdrew the suit and paid the South African 
government’s legal costs.    14
AstraZeneca 
In 1999, British Zeneca merged with Swedish Astra to create what at the time was the 
third largest pharmaceutical company in the world. The merger was considered a union of 
equals. Astra was a leader in the ulcer market, with Prilosec, at the time the world’s best 
selling drug. Yet the dependency on this one drug made the company highly vulnerable 
as its patent was projected to expire in 2001. Today, 55.6% of European AstraZeneca’s 
$17.8 billion in revenues is derived from North America. Its home region of Europe 
accounts for only 31.9% of revenues. Japan accounts for a mere 5.5%, and the remaining 
7% is derived from other markets. It is a host-region oriented firm. 
In 1999, Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) divested its pharmaceutical business 
under the name Zeneca. ICI, the world’s largest producer of paint, remained a chemical 
manufacturer. While Zeneca continued to prosper independently, the separation proved 
devastating for ICI. In the four years that followed, ICI’s shares were significantly 
undervalued, and the company sought acquisitions, including companies it had divested 
to strengthen its position.  
AstraZeneca is a good example of the marketing difficulties pharmaceuticals face 
even after they have cleared drug regulatory bodies. Each national jurisdiction has its 
own rules for marketing drugs, forcing companies to structure their marketing strategies 
to fit the local environment, and preventing the development of a global strategy.  
  Astra Zeneca’s strategy is one of low levels of economic integration in terms of 
marketing and high levels of national responsiveness. In R&D, however, it has high 
levels of economic integration. Indeed, Aventis’ development of a drug can take place in   15
any of its R&D labs across the world and lead to a drug product that can be sold in all 
jurisdictions.  
The weight of the safety and marketing regulations in each national jurisdiction is 
too large relative to overall operations for AstraZeneca to develop a global strategy. The 
emergence of regional blocks means another set of regulations and barriers that 
AstraZeneca must take into account. Therefore, the company cannot have a uniform 
global strategy. Governments are nationally responsive to the demands of their citizens. 
Drugs are perceived differently across national borders. In addition, local communities 
may react differently to drugs. There is also an entire industry built around the approval 
process that governments have an interest in maintaining. 
  A significant risk for pharmaceutical companies is the discovery of new or more 
dramatic side effects that were not discovered during clinical testing. In late 2002, the 
Japanese government restricted the use of Iressa, a drug aimed at patients with lung 
cancer, after over 100 deaths were reported linked to taking the drug. Clinical trials 
showed that lung-cancer patients showed significant improvement after taking the drug. 
The Japanese Ministry of Health did not ban the drug as it considered the benefits to late-
stage cancer patients outweighed the risks. However, the discovery prompted 
AstraZeneca to change its labeling to reflect the risks and the Japanese Ministry of Health 
to require that patients taking the drug be hospitalized for four weeks to monitor side 
effects. In clinical trials, Japanese patients taking Iressa benefited significantly more from 
the drug than other patients. However, it turned out that they were also far more likely to 
suffer from interstitial lung disease (ILD), a side effect of the drug. ILD, the cause of all 
Iressa-related Japanese deaths, occurs in all cancer treatments. Yet, a media panic in   16
Japan made international news and threatened to jeopardize Iressa’s approval in the 
United States and Europe.  
  In the case of Iressa, AstraZeneca made the decision to launch the drug in the 
Japanese market first. The panic that ensued compromised drug approval in its two 
largest markets of Europe and North America. Although a regional strategy is required 
for drug marketing, the strategic launching of pharmaceuticals must be thought of on a 
global basis. Panics in the media do not remain regional. AstraZeneca’s mistake was to 
launch Iressa without examining or taking into consideration that the Japanese were more 
likely to suffer interstitial lung disease. Even though they were also more likely to benefit 
from the drug, the risks associated with it were far higher than for other regions.  
In conclusion, while AstraZeneca has to be careful in its European domestic 
market, it also faces regulations in its large North American market and in the Asian 
market. These prevent the company from adopting a worldwide strategy. At the same 
time, it can be argued that regional effects might have worldwide repercussions. It needs 
to think regionally rather than globally, but continue to consider the intra-regional effects 
of its regional actions. 
Merck 
 
Merck is a U.S. based firm deriving 83.6% of its revenues from its home national market. 
That Merck derives most of its profits from the United States is no surprise. This is the 
case for most large pharmaceutical companies. After all, the United States is the largest 
market, and it has the least price regulation among all industrialized countries. Most of 
Merck’s research is conducted in North America, where the company has six research 
facilities (five in the United States and one in Canada). Yet, despite the dominance of the   17
North American region, the company also has five R&D facilities in Europe and one in 
Japan.  
Merck’s strategy is one of high economic integration and low national 
responsiveness. Although the company is facing different market conditions in Europe 
which would require developing a nationally responsive strategy, this only accounts for a 
small fraction of its operations.  
The company is organized on the basis of products and services. Merck’s 
revenues are derived from prescription, therapeutic, and preventive products. Medco 
Health revenues are derived from the sale of prescription drugs in the United States 
through managed prescription drug programs. Merck has “global” product lines (i.e. run 
in a uniform manner from head office). The firm is basically divided across business 
lines. There is no significant geographic segmentation in terms of business units. A 
product/service based structure that includes nationally-based Medco Health gives Merck 
a competitive advantage against other competitors in the U.S. market, but it does nothing 
to help it compete in other regions of the world. Merck’s strategy is based on centralized 
product/service lines, not regional ones. That is, there is no European SBU to integrate all 
European operations. In addition, the European market is fractured in terms of language, 
culture, and healthcare structure, making a regional strategy more difficult to achieve.  
  Ray Gilmartin, Chairman of Merck, stands by the motto, “Medicine is for the 
people. It is not for the profits. The profits follow.”  This is why the company stood aside 
while the pharmaceutical industry restructured through a wave of mergers in the late 
1990s. At the time, Merck faced the same problems plaguing the entire industry: (1) the 
patent expiry of some of its most important drugs; (2) competition from generic   18
companies; (3) increased price regulation by national and sub-national governments; (4) 
increase costs of developing a drug; and most importantly (5) a slowdown in the number 
of successful new products that it develops. Yet, while competitors rushed to buy rivals to 
increase overall R&D expending, Merck chose to go at it alone relying on the strength of 
its research force. This strength is undisputed. Between 1996 and 2000, the company 
patented 1,933 new compounds, the highest in the industry. That this is done with a lower 
R&D budget than that of other large pharmaceuticals only increases the reputation of 
Merck as a research-oriented company. The benefit of such a vision is that the company 
can lure some of the best scientists, or, at the very least, some of the more dedicated to 
their research.  
One of Merck’s FSAs is the caliber of its researchers. Other FSAs include its 
patented compounds, its pipeline of drugs in progress, and its portfolio of current drugs in 
the market. Merck’s reputation is also an FSA. Not only is the quality of its research well 
regarded by the public, but it is also well regarded in terms of corporate responsibility. 
As a U.S. based firm, Merck is located in the largest pharmaceutical market in the 
world, where most R&D is performed, so it is a hub of innovation that Merck can use to 
improve its competitive position. R&D facilities are often built to take advantage of 
specific human resources in an area or region to take account of government incentives or 
institutional infrastructure, as well as to monitor competitors.  
Merck has also had to take a different stance in poorer countries where the cost of 
medication is prohibitive for many patients. In 2001, Merck, in collaboration with other 
large pharmaceuticals, launched a lawsuit against the South African government. At the 
time, the country was switching to generic drugs to combat AIDS, which was affecting   19
10% of its population. Drug costs were often higher than salaries, and, like Brazil, the 
country had to decide to either honor the patents of large MNEs to produce its own or to 
import it from countries that already legalized generics and produced them at a fraction of 
the cost. Throughout the world, protestors rose up against the lawsuit, forcing 
pharmaceutical companies to justify letting 250,000 people die every year. Merck was the 
quickest to realize the public relations hole which it had dug, and it acted to broker an 
agreement between the industry and developing countries. Merck no longer makes a 
profit from selling HIV drugs in the poorest of countries. Others in the industry complain 
that this inhibits future research, but Merck was quick to point out that as long as 
pharmaceuticals can continue to make significant profits in the developed world, research 
will continue at the same pace.  
 
Pfizer Pharmacia 
In 2000, Pfizer offered $90 billion to Warner-Lambert shareholders to win a hostile 
takeover and snatch the company from American Home Products, which was already 
negotiating a friendly merger with Warner-Lambert. Only two years later the company 
offered $60 billion for Pharmacia. These acquisitions turned Pfizer into the largest 
pharmaceutical company in the world with an estimated $37.5 billion in revenues and a 
$7 billion R&D budget.  
Pfizer is a home-region oriented company with 64.1% of its sales in the United 
States. Its R&D is headquartered in its home region of the United States. Excluding 
Pharmacia, six of the pre-merger company’s R&D facilities are in the North American   20
region (one in Canada and five in the United States). Europe hosts three Pfizer R&D 
facilities and Japan two labs.  
The company operates in two business segments: pharmaceuticals and consumer 
products. The pharmaceutical segment is the largest, accounting for 92% of Pfizer’s 
business and includes human and health pharmaceuticals and capsugel, a capsule-making 
sub-segment. Pfizer’s Consumer Healthcare business manufactures over the counter 
healthcare products, including Listerine, Rolaids, Vizine, and BenGay. International 
operations include both the pharmaceutical and consumer product segments. Marketing is 
conducted through subsidiaries and through distributors.  
In an industry where constant innovation is the most valuable long-term predictor 
of wealth creation, Pfizer is better known for the capabilities of its sales force. To date, its 
competitive advantage has been marketing. Pfizer’s 11% world market can be attributed 
to the company’s sales force of 35,000 representatives.  
Even if Pfizer cannot compete as an innovator, it is well positioned to profit from 
the innovations of others. This might be the company’s saving grace since a large R&D 
budget has produced very little relative to the industry. It costs Pfizer more than three 
times as much to discover a compound that can be patented than it costs its largest U.S. 
competitor, Merck. Between 1996 and 2001, Pfizer patented 1,217 compounds at a cost 
of $17.5 million each. For the same period, Merck patented 1,933 compounds at a cost of 
$6 million each. One of the most compelling reasons given for mergers and acquisitions, 
a large R&D budget, has not yet proven fruitful. For a discussion of the international 
expansion of Pfizer, see Fina and Rugman (1996).   21
Small pharmaceuticals that can produce a prize drug are willing to partner up with 
Pfizer to have the product pitched through their marketing machine. Lipitor was produced 
by Warner-Lambert and marketed through a joint venture with Pfizer. This drug alone 
justified Pfizer’s hostile takeover. Celebrex and Aricept, two other best selling drugs in 
Pfizer’s portfolio, were also discovered by smaller players, Searly and Eisai of Japan.  
 
Eli Lilly 
Eli Lilly, the Indiana-based pharmaceutical company, is a home-region oriented company 
with 59% of its sales derived from within the United States. Western Europe accounts for 
an additional 19.5% of sales. The remaining 21.5% of sales originate in non-specified 
foreign countries. In terms of assets Eli Lilly is even more intra-regional. Nearly 74% of 
all long-lived assets are located in the United States. Western Europe accounts for an 
additional 15.6%. One main explanation for the relative importance of the U.S. market is 
that prices in the United States are significantly higher than in the rest of the 
industrialized countries. As a result, revenues in Eli Lilly’s home region tend to be higher 
regardless of similar unit sales in other regions.  
Eli Lilly only operates in one industry segment, pharmaceuticals. Its business 
units are divided according to product lines which are defined by the type of ailment they 
target. In the United States, Lilly markets its products through 35 wholesale distributors, 
three of which account for nearly 50% of domestic sales. Although the government and 
managed care institutions account for a large portion of sales, direct sales by Lilly are not 
material; it is the wholesalers who process these orders. Lilly takes a more direct role in 
marketing its drugs. This is done through sales representatives who contact physicians,   22
wholesalers, hospitals, managed-care organizations, and governments. These 
representatives are divided in terms of product lines, neurosciences, endocrinology, 
cardiovascular, etc. A special group is dedicated to marketing to managed care 
organizations and to the government. The efforts of sales representatives are 
complemented with advertising in medical journals, distribution of pamphlets, and 
samples to physicians; and, in the United States and Canada, advertising targeted directly 
to customers.  
Eli Lilly’s products are sold internationally despite different regulatory 
environments because it is to the benefit of each country to approve a new medicine. 
Internationally, promotion, distribution and marketing are highly dependent on national 
regulation. Most products are marketed through sales representatives. In the majority of 
foreign countries, Lilly has its own sales force, but in others, it uses independent 
distributors. In 2002, Lilly’s R&D budget was $2.1 billion, or 19.4% of total revenue. In 
the United States, R&D facilities are located in Indiana and Greenfield. There are also 
four European based R&D facilities and three Asia-Pacific based R&D facilities. 
Lilly’s strategy is one of high economic integration and low national 
responsiveness. Although the company faces different market conditions in Western 
Europe that require developing a nationally responsive marketing strategy, this only 
accounts for about 20% of its operations. In its home region, Lilly requires a high degree 
of economic integration. Eli Lilly’s FSAs include its portfolio of patented drugs, its 
pipeline of new drugs, its biotechnology competencies, and its R&D centers. In terms of 
marketing, FSAs are its distribution routes and its sales representatives, both in the U.S. 
market and internationally. Changes in patent legislation that allow generic firms and   23
large pharmaceuticals to produce a competing drug reduce Lilly’s FSAs. Its 
biotechnology competencies and its R&D centers all contribute to developing drugs that 
can one day be patented drugs that can be sold across borders. FSAs relating to 
marketing, however, are not transferable to other countries or regions. This is because of 
differences in regulations not only in each country, but also because of cultural 
differences, including language.  
    
Conclusion 
 
Innovation in the chemicals and pharmaceuticals industry occurs largely within the home 
region bases of the large MNEs. There are two distinctive markets in North America and 
Europe for pharmaceuticals; these markets are segmented by strong regulations and 
different institutional frameworks for distribution and marketing. Even within the E.U., 
there are strong national differences in regulatory regimes. These segmented national and 
regional markets deny MNEs the potential R&D and marketing global scale economies in 
production that they might otherwise wish to achieve. Pharmaceutical MNEs, in 
particular, are not global. Chemical MNEs can be more global, but such MNEs are much 
less innovative than pharmaceutical ones. Both sets of MNEs have regional, rather than 
global, strategies.  
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Table 1: The Top 500 MNEs, by Industry 
 
Industry Category No of Firms in the Fortune 500 No. of Firms in the RNGMA  % of total
Manufacturing 206 180 87.4                   
1 Aerospace and Defense 11 11 100.0                 
2 Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals 19 18 94.7                   
3 Computer, Office & Electronics 39 36 92.3                   
4 Construction, Building Materials and Glass 12 11 91.7                   
5 Energy, Petroleum & Refining 43 31 72.1                   
6 Food, Drug & Tobacco 18 14 77.8                   
7 Motor Vehicle and Parts 31 29 93.5                   
8 Other Manufacturing  13 13 100.0                 
9 Natural Resource Manufacturing 20 17 85.0                   
Services 294 200 68.0                   
1 Banks 62 40 64.5                   
2 Entertainment, Printing & Publishing 9 9 100.0                 
3 Merchandisers 77 63 81.8                   
4 Other Financial Services 58 27 46.6                   
5 Other Services 25 21 84.0                   
6 Telecommunications & Utilities 43 27 62.8                   
7 Transportation Services 20 13 65.0                   
Total 500 380 76.0                   
Source: Braintrust Research Group, The Regional Nature of Global Multinational Activity, 2003.
(www.braintrustresearch.com)  
Data are for 2001  25
Table 2: The Regional Nature of the Chemical and Pharmaceutical MNEs 
 
 
                      
          Revenues    F/T    % intra     North America       Europe       Asia Pacific     
   Company  Region   in bn US$    Sales    regional    (%)       (%)       (%)     
                                   
Bi-Regional                    
                      
1  Bayer  Europe              27.5    na               41.3               30.6                 41.3                 16.6    
2  Aventis (q)  Europe              21.6               91.2               36.4               44.8                 36.4                   6.4    
3  Novartis  Europe              20.9               98.0               47.0               47.0                 33.0                 17.0  f 
4  Roche Group  Europe              19.2               98.2               37.1               38.0   z              37.1                 13.6    
                      
Host-region oriented                    
                      
1  GlaxoSmithKline  Europe              42.6               95.7               28.6               50.9   z              28.6      na    
2  AstraZeneca  Europe              17.8    na               31.9               55.6                 31.9                   5.5   j 
                      
Home-region oriented                    
                      
1  Merck  North America              51.8               16.0               84.0               84.0   z   na      na    
2  Johnson & Johnson  North America              36.3               38.1               61.9               61.9   z              21.0                 11.5   f 
3  Pfizer  North America              32.4               35.9               64.1               64.1   z   na                 29.8   j 
4  BASF   Europe              30.6               78.4               58.9               24.2                 58.9                 15.7   f 
5  DuPont de Nemours (E.I.)  North America              24.0               52.4               53.4               53.4                 26.3   m                7.3    
6  Bristol-Myers Squibb  North America              18.2               37.6               62.4               62.4                 22.2   m   na    
7  Abbott Laboratories  North America              17.7               37.8               65.1               65.1   a   na      na    
8  Wyeth  North America              14.6               36.7               63.3               63.3                   5.1   u   na    
9  Mitsubishi Chemical  Asia-Pacific              13.4               16.0               85.5    na      na                 85.5    
10  Akzo Nobel  Europe              13.3               94.0               52.0               27.0   a              52.0                 11.0    
11  Eli Lilly  North America              11.1               41.0               59.0               59.0   z              19.5   w   na    
                      
Insufficient Information                    
                      
1  Dow Chemical  North America              27.6               59.2               40.8               40.8   z              33.4      na    
                    
Other                  
                    
1  Pharmacia  (Acquired by Pfizer July 2002)                 
                   
Weighted Average*               24.47                 54.5              
Total               440.5                  
                                   
                    
Data are for 2002 
Note: z. refers to the U.S. only; a. refers to Canada and the U.S.; m. refers to Europe, the Middle East and Africa; j. refers to Japan 
only; f. includes figures for Africa.  q. Regional data on Aventis are calculated using data for its core business, which represents 85% 
of revenues. To calculate revenues in US dollars, where the company did not provide a figure, the following exchange rates were used: 
euro (0.9495); Swiss Franc (0.64505) and Pound (1.50377).  *Weighted intra-regional sales average is weighted according to 
revenues.  
Numbers might not add up due to rounding.     26
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Table 3: Research and Development in the Chemical and Pharmaceutical Industries  
 
Revenues R&D R&D
Company Industry Region in bn US$ in bn US$ % of Sales
1 Merck Pharmaceutical North America 51.8                   2.7                   5.2                  
2 GlaxoSmithKline Pharmaceutical Europe 42.6                   4.4                   10.2                
3 Johnson & Johnson Pharmaceutical North America 36.3                   4.0                   10.9                
4 Pfizer Pharmaceutical North America 32.4                   5.2                   16.0                
5 BASF Chemical Europe 30.6                   1.1                   3.5                  
6 Dow Chemical Chemical North America 27.6                   1.1                   3.9                  
7 Bayer Chemical Europe 27.5                   2.4                   8.7                  
8 DuPont de Nemours (E.I.) Chemical North America 24.0                   1.3                   5.3                  
9 Aventis Pharmaceutical Europe 21.6                   3.6                   16.6                
10 Novartis Pharmaceutical Europe 20.9                   2.8                   13.4                
11 Roche Group Pharmaceutical Europe 19.2                   2.7                   14.3                
12 Bristol-Myers Squibb Pharmaceutical North America 18.2                   2.2                   12.2                
13 AstraZeneca Pharmaceutical Europe 17.8                   3.1                   17.2                
14 Abbott Laboratories Pharmaceutical North America 17.7                   1.6                   8.8                  
15 Wyeth Pharmaceutical North America 14.6                   2.1                   14.3                
16 Mitsubishi Chemical Chemical Asia-Pacific 13.4                   0.6                   4.8                  
17 Akzo Nobel Chemical Europe 13.3                   0.9                   6.5                  
18 Eli Lilly Pharmaceutical North America 11.1                   2.1                   19.4                
19 Pharmacia (Acquired by Pfizer July 2002)
Average 24.5                   2.4                   9.9                  
Total 440.5                 43.7                
Data are for 2002
Source: Braintrust Research Group (www.braintrustresearch.com)    28
  
 
Table 4: The Chemical and Pharmaceutical Industries, a Comparison 
Revenues F/T % intra  R&D
Company Region in bn US$ Sales regional % of Sales
Chemical Industry
1 BASF Europe 30.6                    78.4                    58.9                    3.5                
2 Dow Chemical North America 27.6                    59.2                    40.8                    z 3.9                
3 Bayer Europe 27.5                    na 41.3                    8.7                
4 DuPont de Nemours (E.I.) North America 24.0                    52.4                    53.4                    5.3                
5 Mitsubishi Chemical Asia-Pacific 13.4                    16.0                    85.5                    f 4.8                
6 Akzo Nobel Europe 13.3                    94.0                    52.0                    6.5                
Average* 22.7                    62.4                    52.7                    5.4                
Total 136.4                 
Pharmaceutical Industry
1 Merck North America 51.8                    16.0                    84.0                    z 5.2                
2 GlaxoSmithKline Europe 42.6                    95.7                    28.6                    10.2              
3 Johnson & Johnson North America 36.3                    38.1                    61.9                    z 10.9              
4 Pfizer North America 32.4                    35.9                    64.1                    z 16.0              
5 Aventis* Europe 21.6                    91.2                    36.4                    16.6              
6 Novartis Europe 20.9                    98.0                    47.0                    13.4              
7 Roche Group Europe 19.2                    98.2                    37.1                    14.3              
8 Bristol-Myers Squibb North America 18.2                    37.6                    62.4                    12.2              
9 AstraZeneca Europe 17.8                    na 31.9                    17.2              
10 Abbott Laboratories North America 17.7                    37.8                    65.1                    a 8.8                
11 Wyeth North America 14.6                    36.7                    63.3                    14.3              
12 Eli Lilly North America 11.1                    41.0                    59.0                    z 19.4              
Average 25.3                    54.8                    55.3                    12.0              
Total 304.17               
Note: Averages for F/T Sales exclude companies for which data is not available.  If the same companies were 
excluded from the % intra-regional column, the averages would be 55.5% for chemicals and 56.7% for 
pharmaceuticals. If the same companies are excluded from R&D as % of sales, the averages are 4.5% for 
chemicals and 11.6% for pharmaceuticals
Data are for 2002
Source: Braintrust Research Group (www.braintrustresearch.com)  29
Table 5: Chemical Multinationals’ Distribution of R&D Facilities Across the Triad  
North America Europe Asia Pacific
Company Country Region % of total % of total % of total
1 AstraZeneca Sweden Europe 33.3                    55.6                    11.1                   
2 Merck United States North America 50.0                    41.7                    8.3                     
3 Pfizer United States North America 54.5                    27.3                    18.2                   
4 DuPont United States North America 53.3                    z na na
5 Aventis France Europe 25.0                    50.0                    25.0                   
6 GlaxoSmithKline United Kingdom Europe 25.0                    70.0                    5.0                     
7 Roche Group Switzerland Europe 36.8                    52.6                    10.5                   
Source: Individual Annual Reports, 2002  
Notes: z. United States only   30
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